Entry Deterrence under Agency Constraints
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More about this item
Keywordsentry deterrence; agency; financial intermediation; licensing; divisionalization;
All these keywords.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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