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Incentive Separability

Author

Listed:
  • Paweł Doligalski
  • Piotr Dworczak
  • Joanna Krysta
  • Filip Tokarski

Abstract

We consider a general mechanism-design environment with incentive constraints resulting from frictions such as adverse selection or moral hazard. A set of decisions is defined as incentive-separable if, starting at an initial allocation, perturbing these decisions along agents’ indifference curves preserves the incentive constraints. We show that, under regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism allows agents to make unrestricted choices over incentive-separable decisions, given some prices and budgets. This finding extends and unifies the classical results on the optimal taxation of commodities (Atkinson–Stiglitz and Diamond–Mirrlees theorems) and provides a novel justification for in-kind redistribution programs similar to food stamps.

Suggested Citation

  • Paweł Doligalski & Piotr Dworczak & Joanna Krysta & Filip Tokarski, 2025. "Incentive Separability," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(3), pages 539-567.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpemic:doi:10.1086/732834
    DOI: 10.1086/732834
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    Cited by:

    1. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2025. "Commodity Taxes under Partial Separability Cannot Be Undistorted," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 25-09, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2025. "Linear Commodity Tax Reform and Optimal Commodity Taxes under Partial Separability," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 25-09-Rev2., Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised Jan 2026.
    3. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth, 2025. "Tax avoidance and commodity tax differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 257(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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