On Incentives for an Efficient Flow of Knowledge within Multinationals
In this paper we develop a principal-agent, game-theoretic model of an MNC, intended to add to the understanding of how smart choices between incentives, monitoring, and structures are linked to an effective intra-firm flow of knowledge. We find that the equilibrium depends on the efficiency of substituting incentives for monitoring. Our study sheds light on arguments within the international management field about monitoring, incentives for managers, and managing knowledge transfer between subsidiaries.
Volume (Year): 2 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers
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"Transferring Knowledge in MNCs: The Role of Sources of Subsidiary Knowledge and Organizational Context,"
IVS/CBS Working Papers
00-12, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School.
- Foss, Nicolai J. & Pedersen, Torben, 2002. "Transferring knowledge in MNCs: The role of sources of subsidiary knowledge and organizational context," Journal of International Management, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-67.
- Foss, Nicolai J. & Pedersen, Torben, 2000. "Transferring Knowledge in MNCs: The Role of Sources of Subsidiary Knowledge and Organizational Context," Working Papers 6-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of International Economics and Management.
- Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
- Gupta, Anil K. & Govindarajan, V., 1994. "Organizing for knowledge flows within MNCs," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 443-457, December.
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