On Incentives for an Efficient Flow of Knowledge within Multinationals
In this paper we develop a principal-agent, game-theoretic model of an MNC, intended to add to the understanding of how smart choices between incentives, monitoring, and structures are linked to an effective intra-firm flow of knowledge. We find that the equilibrium depends on the efficiency of substituting incentives for monitoring. Our study sheds light on arguments within the international management field about monitoring, incentives for managers, and managing knowledge transfer between subsidiaries.
Volume (Year): 2 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Journal of International Management,
Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-67.
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