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Nivelación interterritorial e ineficiencia de las decisiones presupuestarias: reflexiones para el caso español

Author

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  • Santiago Lago Peñas

    (Universidad de Vigo)

Abstract

En este trabajo se estudian los efectos negativos de los esquemas de nivelación horizontal sobre la eficiencia en las elecciones fiscales de los gobiernos regionales. Partiendo de unos resultados teóricos básicos, se examinan los aspectos dinámicos del problema, se ofrece alguna evidencia empírica para el caso español y se presenta una solución que combina los criterios de eficiencia y equidad. La conclusión principal es que la incidencia de los desincentivos se puede reducir de forma significativa, sin renunciar a un nivel de equidad elevado. Desde este punto de vista, se analiza la última reforma del sistema de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas y se alude a la discusión teórica sobre los mejores indicadores de capacidad fiscal de una región y sus implicaciones para el caso español. Classification-JEL : H73, H77.

Suggested Citation

  • Santiago Lago Peñas, 2002. "Nivelación interterritorial e ineficiencia de las decisiones presupuestarias: reflexiones para el caso español," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 162(3), pages 79-100, ¨Septembe.
    • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2002:v:162:i:3:p:79-100
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    nivelación horizontal; Comunidades Autónomas; decisiones fiscales; incentivos negativos; crecimiento económico regional;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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