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Study on Green Building Promotion Incentive Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game between Government and Construction Unit

Author

Listed:
  • Xiaojuan Li

    (College of Transportation and Civil Engineering, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350108, China)

  • Chen Wang

    (College of Civil Engineering, Huaqiao University, Xiamen 361021, China)

  • Mukhtar A. Kassem

    (Department of Quantity Surveying, Faculty of Built Environment & Surveying, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Skudai 81310, Malaysia)

  • Yishu Liu

    (College of Transportation and Civil Engineering, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, Fuzhou 350108, China)

  • Kherun Nita Ali

    (Department of Quantity Surveying, Faculty of Built Environment & Surveying, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Skudai 81310, Malaysia)

Abstract

Green buildings are considered to be an effective way to save energy, reduce emissions, and protect the environment. As one of the main bodies of green building construction, the construction unit’s willingness to build seriously affects the promotion of green building. Therefore, based on the viewpoints of natural persons and bounded rationality, this study constructs an evolutionary game analysis model, analyzes the impact of local government subsidy policies on the application strategies of construction units, and analyzes the steady-state and selection strategies. The system dynamics model is established using a flow chart, and the simulation results show that, in the long run, increasing the government subsidy and inspection cost cannot improve the application probability of the construction unit. Furthermore, the inspection intensity of the government and the indirect income of the construction unit has a direct influence on the application probability of the construction unit. The results show that the government should adjust the amount of the subsidy reasonably, improve the penalty mechanism, reduce development costs, strengthen publicity, and encourage construction units to actively apply for green buildings, so as to realize the transformation and upgrade of China’s construction industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaojuan Li & Chen Wang & Mukhtar A. Kassem & Yishu Liu & Kherun Nita Ali, 2022. "Study on Green Building Promotion Incentive Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game between Government and Construction Unit," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(16), pages 1-15, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:16:p:10155-:d:889407
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shang-Yuan Chen & Jui-Ting Huang, 2012. "A Smart Green Building: An Environmental Health Control Design," Energies, MDPI, vol. 5(5), pages 1-16, May.
    2. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    3. Yayun Shen & Michael Faure, 2021. "Green building in China," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 183-199, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Shaoliang Li & Xiazhong Zheng & Qin Zeng, 2023. "Can Green Finance Drive the Development of the Green Building Industry?—Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(17), pages 1-17, August.
    2. Shi Yin & Yudan Zhao, 2024. "An agent-based evolutionary system model of the transformation from building material industry (BMI) to green intelligent BMI under supply chain management," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-15, December.
    3. Di Li & Qianbin Di & Hailin Mu & Zenglin Han & Hongye Wang & Ye Duan, 2022. "Research on the Impact of Output Adjustment Strategy and Carbon Trading Policy on the Response, Stability and Complexity of Steel Market under the Dynamic Game," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(19), pages 1-40, September.
    4. Li, Qianwen & Qian, Tingyu & Wang, Jiaqi & Long, Ruyin & Chen, Hong & Sun, Chuanwang, 2023. "Social “win-win” promotion of green housing under the four-subject evolutionary game," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(PA).
    5. Zihan Zhang & Junkang Song & Wanjiang Wang, 2023. "Study on the Behavior Strategy of the Subject of Low-Carbon Retrofit of Residential Buildings Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(9), pages 1-25, May.
    6. Zhao, Yu & Gao, Gege & Zhang, Jixiang & Yu, Miao, 2024. "Impact of carbon tax on green building development: An evolutionary game analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    7. Yulin Wang & Xianzhong Mu & Guangwen Hu & Liyuchen Wang & Xueting Zhu, 2025. "Life Cycle Assessment-Based Analysis of Environmental and Economic Benefits in Construction Solid Waste Recycling," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(9), pages 1-32, April.
    8. Li, Qianwen & Qian, Tingyu & Zhang, Xufeng & Long, Ruyin & Chen, Hong & Huang, Han & Liu, Lei & Zhu, Licai & Jiang, Huikang & Zhu, Hanyi, 2023. "How does stakeholder loss aversion affect the promotion of green housing?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 647-668.

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