IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v13y2021i17p9745-d625520.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Two-Stage Auction Mechanism for 3PL Supplier Selection under Risk Aversion

Author

Listed:
  • Fuqiang Lu

    (School of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China)

  • Hualing Bi

    (School of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China)

  • Wenjing Feng

    (Faculty of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 810819, China)

  • Yanli Hu

    (Faculty of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 810819, China)

  • Suxin Wang

    (Faculty of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 810819, China)

  • Xu Zhang

    (School of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China)

Abstract

The third party logistics (3PL) suppliers selection is a key issue in sustainable operation of fourth party logistics (4PL). A two-stage auction mechanism is designed for the selection of 3PL suppliers. Different from previous studies, the paper considers risk preference of 4PL integrators during the auction and uses the prospect theory to establish the auction scoring function of 4PL integrators. First, a first score sealed auction (FSSA) mechanism is used to solve the selection problem. However, the results show that FSSA is not an ideal method. Hence, the English auction (EA) mechanism is combined with the FSSA mechanism to form a two-stage auction. The FSSA is taken as the first stage auction, and the EA is taken as the second stage auction, and the two-stage auction mechanism is constructed. The two-stage auction can improve the utility of the 4PL integrator and the auction efficiency. In addition, for the degree of disclosure of attribute weights in the scoring function, two states, complete information and incomplete information is designed. In case analysis, the validity of the designed two-stage auction mechanism is verified. The 4PL integrator can obtain higher utility under the risk-neutral auction than the risk-averse auction. The complete information auction does not make the 4PL integrator obtain higher utility than the incomplete information auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Fuqiang Lu & Hualing Bi & Wenjing Feng & Yanli Hu & Suxin Wang & Xu Zhang, 2021. "A Two-Stage Auction Mechanism for 3PL Supplier Selection under Risk Aversion," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(17), pages 1-17, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:17:p:9745-:d:625520
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/17/9745/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/17/9745/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
    2. Lionel Dupont & Christophe Bernard & Faiza Hamdi & Faouzi Masmoudi, 2018. "Supplier selection under risk of delivery failure: a decision-support model considering managers’ risk sensitivity," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(3), pages 1054-1069, February.
    3. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Alikhani, Reza & Torabi, S. Ali & Altay, Nezih, 2019. "Strategic supplier selection under sustainability and risk criteria," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C), pages 69-82.
    5. Chunxia Yu & T.N. Wong & Zhi Li, 2017. "A hybrid multi-agent negotiation protocol supporting supplier selection for multiple products with synergy effect," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(1), pages 18-37, January.
    6. Frank Ebinger & Bramwel Omondi, 2020. "Leveraging Digital Approaches for Transparency in Sustainable Supply Chains: A Conceptual Paper," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(15), pages 1-16, July.
    7. Xiang-lin Pan & Xu-hua Lv, 2014. "The Optimal Bidding Strategies Research on Multi-attribute Reverse Auction Mechanism," Springer Books, in: Ershi Qi & Jiang Shen & Runliang Dou (ed.), Proceedings of 2013 4th International Asia Conference on Industrial Engineering and Management Innovation (IEMI2013), edition 127, pages 217-223, Springer.
    8. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Han Bleichrodt & Corina Paraschiv, 2007. "Loss Aversion Under Prospect Theory: A Parameter-Free Measurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(10), pages 1659-1674, October.
    9. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    10. Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
    11. Ravi Bapna & Paulo Goes & Alok Gupta, 2003. "Replicating Online Yankee Auctions to Analyze Auctioneers' and Bidders' Strategies," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 244-268, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:cup:judgdm:v:12:y:2017:i:1:p:81-89 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Philip Bromiley, 2009. "A Prospect Theory Model of Resource Allocation," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 6(3), pages 124-138, September.
    3. Luís Santos-Pinto & Adrian Bruhin & José Mata & Thomas Åstebro, 2015. "Detecting heterogeneous risk attitudes with mixed gambles," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(4), pages 573-600, December.
    4. Ulrich Schmidt & Horst Zank, 2008. "Risk Aversion in Cumulative Prospect Theory," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(1), pages 208-216, January.
    5. Jonathan Chapman & Erik Snowberg & Stephanie Wang & Colin Camerer, 2018. "Loss Attitudes in the U.S. Population: Evidence from Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation (DOSE)," NBER Working Papers 25072, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Julius Pahlke & Sebastian Strasser & Ferdinand Vieider, 2015. "Responsibility effects in decision making under risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 125-146, October.
    7. Sanjit Dhami & Narges Hajimoladarvish, 2020. "Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 8606, CESifo.
    8. Steinel, Wolfgang & Valtcheva, Kalina & Gross, Jörg & Celse, Jérémy & Max, Sylvain & Shalvi, Shaul, 2022. "(Dis)honesty in the face of uncertain gains or losses," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    9. Ulrich Schmidt & Horst Zank, 2012. "A genuine foundation for prospect theory," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 97-113, October.
    10. Jakusch, Sven Thorsten & Meyer, Steffen & Hackethal, Andreas, 2019. "Taming models of prospect theory in the wild? Estimation of Vlcek and Hens (2011)," SAFE Working Paper Series 146, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, revised 2019.
    11. Jonathan P. Beauchamp & Daniel J. Benjamin & Christopher F. Chabris & David I. Laibson, 2015. "Controlling for the Compromise Effect Debiases Estimates of Risk Preference Parameters," NBER Working Papers 21792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Víctor González-Jiménez, 2021. "Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities," Vienna Economics Papers vie2101, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    13. Servaas van Bilsen & Roger J. A. Laeven & Theo E. Nijman, 2020. "Consumption and Portfolio Choice Under Loss Aversion and Endogenous Updating of the Reference Level," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(9), pages 3927-3955, September.
    14. Attema, Arthur E. & Brouwer, Werner B.F. & l’Haridon, Olivier & Pinto, Jose Luis, 2016. "An elicitation of utility for quality of life under prospect theory," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 121-134.
    15. Garbarino, Ellen & Slonim, Robert & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Loss aversion and lying behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 379-393.
    16. Mohammed Abdellaoui & Han Bleichrodt & Olivier l’Haridon, 2013. "Sign-dependence in intertemporal choice," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 225-253, December.
    17. Dierkes, Maik & Erner, Carsten & Zeisberger, Stefan, 2010. "Investment horizon and the attractiveness of investment strategies: A behavioral approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 1032-1046, May.
    18. Nathalie Etchart-Vincent & Olivier l’Haridon, 2011. "Monetary incentives in the loss domain and behavior toward risk: An experimental comparison of three reward schemes including real losses," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 61-83, February.
    19. Heiko Karle & Heiner Schumacher & Rune Vølund, 2020. "Consumer search and the uncertainty effect," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 657766, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    20. Peter Brooks & Simon Peters & Horst Zank, 2014. "Risk behavior for gain, loss, and mixed prospects," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 153-182, August.
    21. Pavlo Blavatskyy, 2021. "A simple non-parametric method for eliciting prospect theory's value function and measuring loss aversion under risk and ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 403-416, October.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:13:y:2021:i:17:p:9745-:d:625520. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.