IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v11y2019i18p5031-d267282.html

An Agent-Based Two-Stage Trading Model for Direct Electricity Procurement of Large Consumers

Author

Listed:
  • Jian Zhang

    (Department of Electrical Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China)

  • Yanan Zheng

    (Energy Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research, Beijing 100038, China)

  • Mingtao Yao

    (Energy Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research, Beijing 100038, China)

  • Huiji Wang

    (School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China)

  • Zhaoguang Hu

    (School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China)

Abstract

Many electricity markets around the world are still at developmental and transitional stages. To complete the transition and achieve the key objectives of perfect market design, designers often choose direct electricity procurement of large consumers (LCs) as a pilot. The trading mechanism is critical because it lays the foundation for the exploration of formulating a trading model and the succeeding solution; however, the existing trading mechanisms of direct electricity procurement struggle to cope with new challenges that electric power systems are facing. This paper proposes a novel two-stage trading mechanism, considering both the fairness and efficiency of direct electricity procurement. Based on the proposed trading mechanism, an agent-based trading model with multiple participants is developed. The simulation results of the transactions between LCs and generation companies (GenCos) illustrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. With this mechanism, LCs and GenCos will have more choices in the trading process and can benefit from the reduction of the average market price. The two-stage trading model provides a new choice for market designers and participants of direct electricity procurement.

Suggested Citation

  • Jian Zhang & Yanan Zheng & Mingtao Yao & Huiji Wang & Zhaoguang Hu, 2019. "An Agent-Based Two-Stage Trading Model for Direct Electricity Procurement of Large Consumers," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(18), pages 1-16, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:11:y:2019:i:18:p:5031-:d:267282
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/18/5031/pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/18/5031/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ni Lei & Lanyun Chen & Chuanwang Sun & Yuan Tao, 2018. "Electricity Market Creation in China: Policy Options from Political Economics Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-15, May.
    2. Fabra, Natalia & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik & Harbord, David, 2002. "Modeling Electricity Auctions," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(7), pages 72-81.
    3. Julija Vasiljevska & Jochem Douw & Anna Mengolini & Igor Nikolic, 2017. "An Agent-Based Model of Electricity Consumer: Smart Metering Policy Implications in Europe," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 20(1), pages 1-12.
    4. Conejo, Antonio J. & Contreras, Javier & Espinola, Rosa & Plazas, Miguel A., 2005. "Forecasting electricity prices for a day-ahead pool-based electric energy market," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 435-462.
    5. repec:bla:jindec:v:47:y:1999:i:1:p:107-24 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Nielsen, Steffen & Sorknæs, Peter & Østergaard, Poul Alberg, 2011. "Electricity market auction settings in a future Danish electricity system with a high penetration of renewable energy sources – A comparison of marginal pricing and pay-as-bid," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 4434-4444.
    7. Jian Zhang & Zhaoguang Hu & Yanan Zheng & Yuhui Zhou & Ziwei Wan, 2017. "Sectoral Electricity Consumption and Economic Growth: The Time Difference Case of China, 2006–2015," Energies, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-14, February.
    8. Yang Yang & Minglei Bao & Yi Ding & Yonghua Song & Zhenzhi Lin & Changzheng Shao, 2018. "Review of Information Disclosure in Different Electricity Markets," Energies, MDPI, vol. 11(12), pages 1-20, December.
    9. Natalia Fabra & Nils‐Henrik Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing electricity auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, March.
    10. Natalia Fabra & Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr & David Harbord, 2006. "Designing Electricity Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 23-46, Spring.
    11. Yu, Nanpeng & Tesfatsion, Leigh & Liu, Chen-Ching, 2012. "Financial Bilateral Contract Negotiation in Wholesale Electricity Markets Using Nash Bargaining Theory," ISU General Staff Papers 201201010800001470, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    12. Richard Green, 1999. "The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 107-124, March.
    13. Foley, A.M. & Ó Gallachóir, B.P. & Hur, J. & Baldick, R. & McKeogh, E.J., 2010. "A strategic review of electricity systems models," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 4522-4530.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thibaut Théate & Sébastien Mathieu & Damien Ernst, 2020. "An Artificial Intelligence Solution for Electricity Procurement in Forward Markets," Energies, MDPI, vol. 13(23), pages 1-17, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Palacio, Sebastián M., 2020. "Predicting collusive patterns in a liberalized electricity market with mandatory auctions of forward contracts," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    2. Crawford, Gregory S. & Crespo, Joseph & Tauchen, Helen, 2007. "Bidding asymmetries in multi-unit auctions: Implications of bid function equilibria in the British spot market for electricity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1233-1268, December.
    3. Ghaninejad, Mousa, 2020. "عرضه، تقاضا، و پیشنهاد قیمت در بازار برق ایران [Supply, Demand, and Bidding in Iran’s Electricity Market]," MPRA Paper 105340, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Baldursson , Fridrik M. & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts in Risky Markets," Memorandum 01/2007, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    5. Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David, 2010. "The supply function equilibrium and its policy implications for wholesale electricity auctions," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 209-226, December.
    6. de Frutos, María-Ángeles & Fabra, Natalia, 2012. "How to allocate forward contracts: The case of electricity markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 451-469.
    7. Holmberg, Pär & Tangerås, Thomas & Ahlqvist, Victor, 2018. "Central- versus Self-Dispatch in Electricity Markets," Working Paper Series 1257, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 27 Mar 2019.
    8. David P. Brown & David E. M. Sappington, 2023. "Employing gain-sharing regulation to promote forward contracting in the electricity sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 30-56, April.
    9. Fabra, Natalia & de Frutos, Maria-Angeles, 2008. "On the Impact of Forward Contract Obligations in Multi-Unit Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 6756, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    10. Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Lee, Myeong Ho & Berg, Nathan, 2016. "Peak-load pricing in duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 47-54.
    11. Fabra, Natalia, 2023. "Reforming European electricity markets: Lessons from the energy crisis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    12. Holmberg, Pär & Newbery, David & Ralph, Daniel, 2013. "Supply function equilibria: Step functions and continuous representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1509-1551.
    13. Llobet, Gerard & Fabra, Natalia, 2019. "Auctions with Unknown Capacities: Understanding Competition among Renewables," CEPR Discussion Papers 14060, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    14. Bajo-Buenestado, Raúl, 2017. "Welfare implications of capacity payments in a price-capped electricity sector: A case study of the Texas market (ERCOT)," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 272-285.
    15. Elberg, Christina & Kranz, Sebastian, 2013. "Capacity Mechanisms and Effects on Market Structure," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79811, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. T. S. Genc, 2009. "Discriminatory Versus Uniform-Price Electricity Auctions with Supply Function Equilibrium," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 9-31, January.
    17. Heikki Peura & Derek W. Bunn, 2015. "Dynamic Pricing of Peak Production," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 63(6), pages 1262-1279, December.
    18. Aitor Ciarreta & María Espinosa, 2010. "Market power in the Spanish electricity auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 42-69, February.
    19. Brown, David P., 2018. "The effect of subsidized entry on capacity auctions and the long-run resource adequacy of electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 205-232.
    20. Willems, Bert & Pollitt, Michael & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik & Banet, Catherine, 2022. "The European Wholesale Electricty Market: From Crisis to Net Zero," Other publications TiSEM 2f225964-853e-4d30-a46d-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:11:y:2019:i:18:p:5031-:d:267282. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.