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Guilt Aversion and Ambiguity in the Battle of Sexes Game

Author

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  • Giuseppe De Marco

    (Department of Management and Quantitative Sciences, University of Napoli Parthenope, Via Generale Parisi 13, 80132 Napoli, Italy
    Center for Studies in Economics and Finance, University of Napoli Federico II, Via Cupa Cinthia, 80126 Napoli, Italy)

  • Maria Romaniello

    (Department of Economics, University of Campania Luigi Vanvitelli, Corso Gran Priorato di Malta, 81043 Capua, Italy)

  • Alba Roviello

    (Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Napoli Federico II, Via Cupa Cinthia, 80126 Napoli, Italy)

Abstract

We analyze the effects of guilt aversion in the Battle of Sexes game by exploiting the theory of psychological games and the concept of psychological Nash equilibrium. We then examine the impact of ambiguity in the (second-order) beliefs by taking into account the theory of psychological games under ambiguity. Our results show that the sensitivity to guilt affects the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game, as a player might be willing to accept a lower expected utility to compensate for the other player’s disutility from guilt. In turn, a pessimistic attitude towards ambiguity makes this effect more evident, as it makes the disutility from guilt greater.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe De Marco & Maria Romaniello & Alba Roviello, 2025. "Guilt Aversion and Ambiguity in the Battle of Sexes Game," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 13(10), pages 1-30, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:13:y:2025:i:10:p:1607-:d:1655514
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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