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Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Tomassini

    () (Information Systems Institute, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland)

  • Enea Pestelacci

    () (Information Systems Institute, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland)

Abstract

We propose a model in which agents of a population interacting according to a network of contacts play games of coordination with each other and can also dynamically break and redirect links to neighbors if they are unsatisfied. As a result, there is co-evolution of strategies in the population and of the graph that represents the network of contacts. We apply the model to the class of pure and general coordination games. For pure coordination games, the networks co-evolve towards the polarization of different strategies. In the case of general coordination games our results show that the possibility of refusing neighbors and choosing different partners increases the success rate of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Tomassini & Enea Pestelacci, 2010. "Coordination Games on Dynamical Networks," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(3), pages 1-20, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:3:p:242-261:d:9125
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Haydée Lugo & Maxi San Miguel, 2014. "Learning and coordinating in a multilayer network," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2014-30, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
    2. repec:kap:jculte:v:41:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10824-016-9272-y is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    evolutionary game theory; coordination games; games on dynamical networks; co-evolution;

    JEL classification:

    • C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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