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Matrix-Based Method for the Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games: A Survey

Author

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  • Xinrong Yang

    (School of Mathematics and Statistics, Shandong Normal University, Jinan 250014, China)

  • Zhenping Geng

    (School of Mathematics and Statistics, Shandong Normal University, Jinan 250014, China)

  • Haitao Li

    (School of Mathematics and Statistics, Shandong Normal University, Jinan 250014, China)

Abstract

In this paper, a detailed survey is presented for the analysis and control of networked evolutionary games via the matrix method. The algebraic form of networked evolutionary games is firstly recalled. Then, some existing results on networked evolutionary games are summarized. Furthermore, several generalized forms of networked evolutionary games are reviewed, including networked evolutionary games with time delay, networked evolutionary games with bankruptcy mechanism, networked evolutionary games with time-varying networks, and random evolutionary Boolean games. The computational complexity of general networked evolutionary games is still challenging, which limits the application of the matrix method to large-scale networked evolutionary games. Future works are finally presented in the conclusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Xinrong Yang & Zhenping Geng & Haitao Li, 2023. "Matrix-Based Method for the Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games: A Survey," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-13, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:14:y:2023:i:2:p:22-:d:1083917
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    References listed on IDEAS

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