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Divine Kingship in the Firm: Reciprocity, Organizational Culture, and Founder Cults

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  • Giuseppe Danese

    (University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

This paper argues that the business firm is a fertile ground for studying how the realms of the ritual and the symbolic affect economic outcomes. In unforeseen contingencies, the contract that the firm draws with its employees is de-facto incomplete. The collaborative nature of organizational tasks, and the long-term nature of many employment contracts, favor the rise of generalized reciprocity between the firm and its workers. This open-ended relationship is guided by both commands (‘hard authority’) and organizational culture (‘subtle authority’). Organizational culture and its standard-bearers often draw on the founder’s values and vision in a fashion that resembles kings’ reliance on metapersons in the political realm. Prominent accounts of entrepreneurship and foundership use a language that closely resembles the rhetoric of divinity and territorial conquest. We conclude with an examination of founder cults in family businesses and startups.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Danese, 2021. "Divine Kingship in the Firm: Reciprocity, Organizational Culture, and Founder Cults," Annals of the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Economics, History and Political Science, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Torino (Italy), vol. 55(1), pages 217-236, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:fle:journl:v:55:y:2021:i:1:p:217-236
    DOI: 10.26331/1141
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Generalized Reciprocity; Organizational Culture; Marshall Sahlins; Founder Cults; Divine Kingship;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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