What have we learned about mortgage default?
By the end of 2009, one out of every 11 mortgages was seriously delinquent or in foreclosure. Economists have devoted considerable energy over the past several years to understanding the underlying causes of this increase in defaults. One goal is to provide a guide to dealing with the existing problems. In addition, a better understanding may help avoid future problems. In “What Have We Learned About Mortgage Default?” Ronel Elul reviews recent research that has shed light on two areas: the extent to which securitization is responsible for the increase in default rates; and the relative contributions of negative equity, compared with “liquidity shocks,” in explaining mortgage default.
Volume (Year): (2010)
Issue (Month): Q4 ()
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- Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Willen, Paul S., 2013.
"Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures and securitization,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 60(7), pages 835-853.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2009. "Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages?: redefaults, self-cures, and securitization," Public Policy Discussion Paper 09-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2009. "Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures and Securitization," NBER Working Papers 15159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2009. "Why don't lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? redefaults, self-cures, and securitization," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2009-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2010.
"What explains differences in foreclosure rates?: a response to Piskorski, Seru, and Vig,"
10-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Manuel Adelino & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2010. "What explains differences in foreclosure rates? a response to Piskorski, Seru, and Vig," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2010-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Vikrant Vig & Amit Seru & Tomasz Piskorski, 2009.
"Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,"
2009 Meeting Papers
1169, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2010. "Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 369-397, September.
- Patrick Bajari & Chenghuan Sean Chu & Minjung Park, 2008. "An Empirical Model of Subprime Mortgage Default From 2000 to 2007," NBER Working Papers 14625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2009. "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1449-1496.
- Ronel Elul & Nicholas S. Souleles & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Dennis Glennon & Robert Hunt, 2010.
"What "Triggers" Mortgage Default?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 490-494, May.
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