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Goals, guidelines, and constraints facing monetary policymakers: an overview

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  • Jeffrey C. Fuhrer

Abstract

Central bankers in the United States and abroad must grapple with a broad array of questions about how best to conduct monetary policy. How much should the goal of price stability be emphasized relative to the goal of employment stability? Does central bank independence aid in achieving either or both of these goals? Does a stable, short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment exist, and can it be exploited by a central bank? What instrument should the central bank manipulate in order to achieve its short-run and long-run goals? ; In June of 1994, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston sponsored a conference to address these questions. The five papers presented fell into three broad areas: first, the efficiency of U.S. monetary policy; second, the usefulness of monetary aggregates for the conduct of monetary policy; and third, an examination of international evidence to shed light on questions of central bank independence and accountability. This article offers an overview of the five papers presented and the comments of the discussants.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, 1994. "Goals, guidelines, and constraints facing monetary policymakers: an overview," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 3-15.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbne:y:1994:i:sep:p:3-15
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    File URL: http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/neer/neer1994/neer594a.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laurence Ball, 1994. "What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?," NBER Chapters,in: Monetary Policy, pages 155-193 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    3. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    4. Steven J. Davis & John Haltiwanger, 1990. "Gross Job Creation and Destruction: Microeconomic Evidence and Macroeconomic Implications," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1990, Volume 5, pages 123-186 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Caballero, Ricardo J & Hammour, Mohamad L, 1994. "The Cleansing Effect of Recessions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1350-1368, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Djeto Assane & Bernard Malamud, 2000. "The Federal Reserve's response to exchange rate shocks," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(5), pages 461-470.
    2. Martha Rosalba Lopezpiñeros, 2004. "Efficient Policy Rulefor Inflation Targeting Incolombia," ENSAYOS SOBRE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ESPE, vol. 22(45), pages 80-115, June.
    3. repec:kap:iaecre:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:287-297 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Jorg Bibow, 2005. "Refocusing the ECB on Output Stabilization and Growth through Inflation Targeting?," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_425, Levy Economics Institute.
    5. David Cobham & Peter Macmillan & David Mcmillan, 2004. "The inflation/output variability trade-off: further evidence," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(6), pages 347-350.
    6. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 1999. "Disegno delle istituzioni e stabilità finanziaria nell'Unione Monetaria Europea," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 243-270.
    7. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Viegi, Nicola, 2001. "Labour Market Reform and Monetary Policy in EMU: Do Asymmetries Matter?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2979, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Bernanke, Ben S. & Mihov, Ilian, 1997. "What does the Bundesbank target?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1025-1053, June.
    9. Nicholas Rowe, 2002. "How to Improve Inflation Targeting at the Bank of Canada," Staff Working Papers 02-23, Bank of Canada.

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