Stable Bank Cooperation for Cost Reduction Problem
In the paper we consider a problem of bank cost reduction by joint usage of ATMs. In coalition case, we assume that cooperation may be naturally restricted by a coalition structure. A question of stability of a coalition structure with respect to the Shapley value is investigated. Statements about the configuration of stable coalition structures are proposed. We also consider special cases in which their existence is proved.
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Volume (Year): 8 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Pages: 7-25
| Handle: | RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2014_007 |
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References listed on IDEAS
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- A. van den Nouweland & P. Borm & W. van Golstein Brouwers & R. Groot Bruinderink & S. Tijs, 1996.
"A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication,"
Management Science,
INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 294-303, February.
- van den Nouweland, A. & Borm, P. & van Golstein, W. & Bruinderink, R.G. & Tijs, S., 1994. "A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication," Papers 9407, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. & Borm, P.E.M. & van Golstein Brouwers, W. & Groot Bruinderink, R. & Tijs, S.H., 1996. "A game theoretic approach to problems in telecommunication," Other publications TiSEM a3b30529-fe17-484c-8eab-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
- repec:spr:compst:v:59:y:2004:i:3:p:405-418 is not listed on IDEAS
- Katsev, Ilya & Yanovskaya, Elena, 2013. "The prenucleolus for games with restricted cooperation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 56-65.
- Faigle, U & Kern, W, 1992. "The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(3), pages 249-266.
- Endre Bjørndal & Herbert Hamers & Maurice Koster, 2004. "Cost allocation in a bank ATM network," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 59(3), pages 405-418, 07.
- Bjorndal, E. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Koster, M.A.L., 2003. "Cost Allocation in a Bank ATM Network," Discussion Paper 2003-13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Schme," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 471.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
- Leon Petrosjan & Svetlana Mamkina, 2006. "Dynamic Games With Coalitional Structures," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(02), pages 295-307.
- Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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