Neither Lucky Nor Good - The Case of Electricity Deregulation in California
We present an integrated summary of the various factors that contributed to shortages of electrical power in California in 2000. Several necessary conditions for the crisis are identified. We conclude that a sufficient remedy may be defined by policies that mitigate the limited incentives to invest in transmission capacity.
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- Paul L. Joskow & Edward Kohn, 2002.
"A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California's Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000,"
The Energy Journal,
International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 1-35.
- Paul Joskow & Edward Kahn, 2001. "A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California's Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000," NBER Working Papers 8157, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joskow, P. & Edward Kahn, 2002. "A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior In California’s Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0211, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Frank Wolak, 2000. "Diagnosing Market Power in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," NBER Working Papers 7868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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