The independence of central bank in view of Rogoff: The Turkish experience
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References listed on IDEAS
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
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More about this item
KeywordsIndependency of Central Bank; Monetary Policy; Time Inconstancy;
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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