Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy
An infinitely repeated monetary policy game à la Barro and Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game.
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|Date of creation:||Apr 1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Oxford Economic Papers, 1996, 48(4) pp 673-80|
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