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Inflation, distortionary taxation and the design of monetary policy: the role of social cohesion

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  • H. PRAST

    (De Nederlandsche Bank)

Abstract

The relationship between central banks and inflation is considered in order to disprove existing studies which state that distortions and inflationary bias occur in the real world. While much attention has been given to the issue in existing studies, no attempt has been made to examine effects of any third factors. Results reveal that inflation is significantly affected by distortionary taxation and that social cohesion leads to price stability in the post Bretton Woods period.

Suggested Citation

  • H. Prast, 1998. "Inflation, distortionary taxation and the design of monetary policy: the role of social cohesion," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 51(204), pages 37-53.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1998:13
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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10589/10473
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Prof. Neil D. Karunaratne, 2000. "Inflation Targeting Macroeconomic Distortions and the Policy Reaction Function," Discussion Papers Series 269, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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