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Types of Multi-Level Governance

  • Hooghe, Liesbet
  • Marks, Gary
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    The reallocation of authority upwards, downwards, and sideways from central states has drawn attention from a growing number of scholars in the social sciences. Yet beyond the bedrock agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no convergence about how it should be organized. This paper draws on various literatures in distinguishing two types of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to multi-task, territorially mutually exclusive jurisdictions in a relatively stable system with limited jurisdictional levels and a limited number of units. A second type of governance pictures specialized, territorially overlapping jurisdictions in a relatively flexible, non-tiered system with a large number of jurisdictions. We find that both types co-exist in different locations, and we explain some facets of this co-existence.

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    Article provided by European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A) in its journal European Integration online Papers (EIoP).

    Volume (Year): 5 (2001)
    Issue (Month): (October)
    Pages:

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    Handle: RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0071
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    1. Enrico Spolaore & Alberto Alesina & Romain Wacziarg, 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1276-1296, December.
    2. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
    3. Nicolaidis, Kalypso & Howse, Robert (ed.), 2001. "The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199245000, March.
    4. Casella, Alessandra & Frey, Bruno, 1992. "Federalism and clubs : Towards an economic theory of overlapping political jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 639-646, April.
    5. Bureau, Dominique & Champsaur, Paul, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and European Economic Unification," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 88-92, May.
    6. Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October.
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