IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/erp/eiopxx/p0071.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Types of Multi-Level Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Hooghe, Liesbet
  • Marks, Gary

Abstract

The reallocation of authority upwards, downwards, and sideways from central states has drawn attention from a growing number of scholars in the social sciences. Yet beyond the bedrock agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no convergence about how it should be organized. This paper draws on various literatures in distinguishing two types of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to multi-task, territorially mutually exclusive jurisdictions in a relatively stable system with limited jurisdictional levels and a limited number of units. A second type of governance pictures specialized, territorially overlapping jurisdictions in a relatively flexible, non-tiered system with a large number of jurisdictions. We find that both types co-exist in different locations, and we explain some facets of this co-existence.

Suggested Citation

  • Hooghe, Liesbet & Marks, Gary, 2001. "Types of Multi-Level Governance," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 5, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0071
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011a.htm
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-011.htm
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2001-011.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicolaidis, Kalypso & Howse, Robert (ed.), 2001. "The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199245000.
    2. Enrico Spolaore & Alberto Alesina & Romain Wacziarg, 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1276-1296, December.
    3. Bureau, Dominique & Champsaur, Paul, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and European Economic Unification," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 88-92, May.
    4. Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
    5. Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October.
    6. Casella, Alessandra & Frey, Bruno, 1992. "Federalism and clubs : Towards an economic theory of overlapping political jurisdictions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 639-646, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tamas Fleischer & Peter Futo, 2005. "EU integration mechanisms affecting Hungarian public policies in waste management," IWE Working Papers 153, Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies- Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    2. Marie-Claude BĂ©lis-Bergouignan & Elie Brugarolas, 2010. "Building research and technology (R&T) transregional networks through an Interreg IIIB project," Regional Science Policy & Practice, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 135-155, November.
    3. Tanja E. Aalberts, 2004. "The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe - A Constructivist Reading," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 23-46, February.
    4. repec:bla:kyklos:v:70:y:2017:i:2:p:256-277 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Sharmina, Maria, 2017. "Low-carbon scenarios for Russia's energy system: A participative backcasting approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 303-315.
    6. Fritz Breuss & Markus Eller, 2004. "The Optimal Decentralisation of Government Activity: Normative Recommendations for the European Constitution," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 27-76, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0071. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Editorial Assistant). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ecsaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.