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Testing the Pareto Efficiency of Household Resource Allocations

Author

Listed:
  • Patricia Apps

    (University of Sydney and IZA)

  • Ray Rees

    (CES, University of Munich)

Abstract

In a careful and thorough empirical study, Christopher Udry (1996) shows convincingly that, in a large sample of West African households, household resource allocations were not Pareto efficient. This paper argues that observation of the Pareto inefficiency of a household resource allocation does not, however, refute the hypothesis that it chooses this resource allocation as if it maximises some form of household welfare function possessing the Pareto property. To refute that hypothesis it is necessary to show that the observed allocation does not represent a second best optimum. For this it will be necessary to show that the estimated parameters of the model lie in a region of the parameter space for which the second best optimality of the allocation does not hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Patricia Apps & Ray Rees, 2010. "Testing the Pareto Efficiency of Household Resource Allocations," Ekonomia, Cyprus Economic Society and University of Cyprus, vol. 13(2-1), pages 57-68, Winter-Su.
  • Handle: RePEc:ekn:ekonom:v:13-14:y:2010-2011:i:2-1:p:57-68
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alberto Alesina & Andrea Ichino & Loukas Karabarbounis, 2011. "Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 1-40, May.
    2. Paul A. Samuelson, 1956. "Social Indifference Curves," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 1-22.
    3. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    4. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
    5. Chen, Zhiqi & Woolley, Frances, 2001. "A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 722-748, October.
    6. Apps, Patricia & Rees, Ray, 2007. "Cooperative Household Models," IZA Discussion Papers 3127, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2021. "Bargaining in the Family," CHILD Working Papers Series 88 JEL Classification: D1, Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - CCA.
    2. Jean-Paul Chavas & Eleonora Matteazzi & Martina Menon & Federico Perali, 2022. "(In)Efficient Bargaining in the Family," Working Papers 2, SITES.
    3. Sergii Maksymovych, 2017. "Decision-Making in the Household and Material Deprivation," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp604, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets

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