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Determinants and Consequences of Bailing Out States in Mexico

Author

Listed:
  • Fausto Hernandez Trillo

    (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economica A.C.)

  • Alberto Diaz Cayeros

    (Centro de Investigacion para el Desarrollo)

  • Rafael Gamboa Gonzalez

    (Banco de Mexico)

Abstract

This paper identifies and analyzes the determinants and consequences of bailing out states, in particular, those observed in Mexico. This case is important because lessons can be obtained for other LDCs. Bailouts of lower-level governments have not been the object of much research in economics. This work suggests that the explicit generalized bailout carried out by the federal government in Mexico in 1995 created a moral hazard problem. The existing institutional-legal framework is not adequate, because it provides incentives for states to borrow and for banks to lend without evaluating the risk of the project. Likewise, the importance of the state (size) is a major determinant in providing bailout transfers. Also, the more a state government is in fiscal need when the state government is incapable of adjusting its expenditure, the more likely the state is to get an extraordinary transfer during the period of study. On the other hand, political variables are not an important determinant of a bailout, except, perhaps, when there are state elections. We also show that excessive indebtedness of local states may have equity implications as well: bailouts tend to be highly regressive, as the poorer –low indebted- states receive much less in extraordinary resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Fausto Hernandez Trillo & Alberto Diaz Cayeros & Rafael Gamboa Gonzalez, 2002. "Determinants and Consequences of Bailing Out States in Mexico," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 28(3), pages 365-380, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:28:y:2002:i:3:p:365-380
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    File URL: http://web.holycross.edu/RePEc/eej/Archive/Volume28/V28N3P365_380.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:idb:brikps:6800 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. von Hagen, Jurgen & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 134-138, May.
    3. Goodhart, C A E, 1987. "Why Do Banks Need a Central Bank?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 75-89, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eichler, Stefan & Hofmann, Michael, 2013. "Sovereign default risk and decentralization: Evidence for emerging markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 113-134.
    2. Fausto Hernández Trillo & Brenda Jarillo Rabling, 2007. "Transferencias condicionadas federales en países en desarrollo: el caso del FISM en México," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 22(2), pages 143-184.
    3. Mendoza-Velázquez, Alfonso, 2009. "The information content and redistribution effects of state and municipal rating changes in Mexico," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 3, pages 1-21.
    4. Alfonso Mendoza-Velázquez & Heidi J. Smith & Diego Mendoza-Martínez, 2023. "Regional Growth, Debt Thresholds and Subnational Sustainability," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 18(2), pages 1-23, Abril - J.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development

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