Is the travel time of private roads too short, too long, or just right?
We consider price and service-quality setting in oligopolistic markets for congestible services, applied to the case of private roads. Previous studies show that parallel competitors set a volume/capacity ratio (and thereby a travel time or service quality) that is socially optimal if they take the actions of the others as given. We find that this result does not hold when capacity and toll setting are separate stages—as then firms aim to limit toll competition by setting lower capacities, and thus higher travel times—or when firms set capacities sequentially, as then firms aim to limit the capacities of later entrants by setting higher capacities. In our Stackelberg competition, the last firm to act has no capacity decisions to influence. Hence, it is only concerned with the toll-competition substage, and sets a travel time that is longer than socially optimal. The first firm cares mostly about the competitors’ capacities that it can influence: it sets a travel time that is shorter than socially optimal. The average travel time will be too short from a societal point of view.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 46 (2012)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/548/description#description|
|Order Information:|| Postal: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wu, Di & Yin, Yafeng & Yang, Hai, 2011. "The independence of volume-capacity ratio of private toll roads in general networks," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 96-101, January.
- Xiao, Feng & Yang, Hai & Han, Deren, 2007. "Competition and efficiency of private toll roads," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 292-308, March.
- Luski, Israel, 1976. "On Partial Equilibrium in a Queuing System with Two Servers," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 519-25, October.
- De Vany, Arthur & Saving, Thomas R, 1980. "Competition and Highway Pricing for Stochastic Traffic," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 45-60, January.
- Verhoef, Erik T., 2007. "Second-best road pricing through highway franchising," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 337-361, September.
- Reitman, David, 1991. "Endogenous Quality Differentiation in Congested Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 621-47, December.
- A. Michael Spence, 1975. "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 417-429, Autumn.
- Winston, Clifford & Yan, Jia, 2011.
"Can privatization of U.S. highways improve motorists' welfare?,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 993-1005.
- Winston, Clifford & Yan, Jia, 2011. "Can privatization of U.S. highways improve motorists' welfare?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 993-1005, August.
- Zhang, Anming & Zhang, Yimin, 2006. "Airport capacity and congestion when carriers have market power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 229-247, September.
- Paul Calcott & Shuntian Yao, 2005. "Competition between highway operators: can we expect toll differentiation?," Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series 0504, Nanyang Technological University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Economic Growth Centre.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Bimpikis, Kostas & Ozdaglar, Asuman, 2009.
"Price and capacity competition,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 1-26, May.
- Basso, Leonardo J. & Zhang, Anming, 2007. "Congestible facility rivalry in vertical structures," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 218-237, March.
- Lei Zhang & David M. Levinson & Shanjiang Zhu, 2008. "Agent-Based Model of Price Competition, Capacity Choice, and Product Differentiation on Congested Networks," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 42(3), pages 435-461, September.
- Brownstone, David & Ghosh, Arindam & Golob, Thomas F. & Kazimi, Camilla & Van Amelsfort, Dirk, 2003. "Drivers' willingness-to-pay to reduce travel time: evidence from the San Diego I-15 congestion pricing project," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 373-387, May.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1999.
"Toll competition among congested roads,"
Documentos de Trabajo
54, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Edelson, Noel M, 1971. "Congestion Tolls Under Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(5), pages 873-82, December.
- Erik T. Verhoef, 2008. "Private Roads: Auctions and Competition in Networks," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 42(3), pages 463-493, September.
- Mills, David E, 1981. "Ownership Arrangements and Congestion-Prone Facilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 493-502, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:transb:v:46:y:2012:i:8:p:971-983. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.