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Hotel outsourcing under asset specificity: “The good, the bad and the ugly”

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  • De Vita, Glauco
  • Tekaya, Arafet

Abstract

This paper presents three case studies developed to investigate outsourcing outcomes in the Tunisian hotel industry. The paper applies a transaction cost economics (TCE) logic to examine potential contracting problems stemming from hotel outsourcing under asset specificity conditions. Working within the tradition of post-positivism, we find case study evidence of significant falsification value regarding TCE propositions on the performance consequences of unilateral and bilateral relation-specific investments and their holdup potential. Our insights have important practical implications for the management of hotel outsourcing relationships characterized by high asset specificity.

Suggested Citation

  • De Vita, Glauco & Tekaya, Arafet, 2015. "Hotel outsourcing under asset specificity: “The good, the bad and the ugly”," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 97-106.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:touman:v:47:y:2015:i:c:p:97-106
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tourman.2014.09.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Lei & Jiang, Fuming & Li, Jun & Motohashi, Kazuyuki & Zheng, Xiaosong, 2019. "The contingent effects of asset specificity, contract specificity, and trust on offshore relationship performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 338-349.
    2. Pei Chun-Lai & Tomás F Espino-Rodríguez & Tom Baum, 2019. "Do relational norms matter in outsourcing relationships? Lesson learned from hotel sectors," Tourism Economics, , vol. 25(2), pages 189-212, March.

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