A new prevention paradox: The trade-off between reducing incentives for risk selection and increasing the incentives for prevention for health insurers
The Dutch risk equalization scheme has been improved over the years by including health related risk adjusters. The purpose of the Dutch risk equalization scheme is to prevent risk selection and to correct for predictable losses and gains for insurers. The objective of this paper is to explore the financial incentives for risk selection under the Dutch risk equalization scheme.
Volume (Year): 76 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
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