Do poachers make harsh gamekeepers? Attitudes to tax evasion and to benefit fraud
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More about this item
Keywords3040; 2340; Benefit fraud; Fiscal morale; Tax evasion; Value function;
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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