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Counterbalance effect of multiple major shareholders in Chinese listed companies: A strategic decision-making perspective

Author

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  • Kong, Xiaoxu
  • Ning, Peipei
  • Tang, Xiaomeng

Abstract

The ownership structure of multiple major shareholders is very prevalent among China’s listed companies and has a vital impact on corporate strategy. This study examines the influence of multiple major shareholders on corporate differentiation strategy in Chinese listed companies. The results show that multiple major shareholders promote the decision and implementation of enterprise differentiation strategy. Board capital width and depth play a mediating role. Financial redundancy and corporate competitive culture positively moderate the relationship between multiple major shareholders and differentiation strategy, while human resource redundancy has a negative effect. Further research shows that in enterprises with multiple major shareholders, differentiation strategy can improve performance. From the perspective of equity balance, this study examines the role of multiple major shareholders in emerging markets to provide insights for improving the modern corporate governance system and guidance for enterprises to implement competitive strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Kong, Xiaoxu & Ning, Peipei & Tang, Xiaomeng, 2023. "Counterbalance effect of multiple major shareholders in Chinese listed companies: A strategic decision-making perspective," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:66:y:2023:i:c:s0275531923001307
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.102004
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    1. Li, WeiWei & Huang, Chia-Hsing, 2024. "Multiple large shareholders and asset-liability maturity mismatches," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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