Developing countries and international environmental agreements: The case of perfect correlation
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- Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March.
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Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 3-9, October.
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- Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1996. "An Agenda For The Design And Study Of International Environmental Agreements," Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers 28353, Utah State University, Economics Department.
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91-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1990. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-01, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Sappington, David & Demski, Joel S., 1983. "Multi-agent control in perfectly correlated environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 325-330.
- Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1996.
"Developing Countries and Environmental Protection: The Effects of Budget Balance and Pollution Ceiling Constraints,"
9617, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
- Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1997. "Developing countries and environmental protection: the effects of budget balance and pollution ceiling constraints," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 285-305, December.
- Batabyal, Amitrajeet A., 1996. "Developing Countries And Environmental Protection: The Effect Of Budget Balance And Pollution Ceiling Constraints," Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers 28347, Utah State University, Economics Department.
- Todd Sandler & Keith Sargent, 1995. "Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 71(2), pages 145-162.
- Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
- Black, Jane & Levi, Maurice D & de Meza, David, 1993. "Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation for Tackling the 'Greenhouse Effect.'," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 60(239), pages 281-93, August.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-59, January.
- Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
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