Developing Countries and Environmental Protection: Contract Design in Perfectly Correlated Environments
I study the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited funds that wishes to design an international environmental agreement (IEA) for less developed countries (LDCs). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but it must deal with such firms through their national governments. I study this tripartite hierarchical interaction for two LDCs. My principal result is that despite the perfect correlation in the private information of the governments and the firms across the two countries, and in contrast with the result contained in Batabyal (1998a), the SNGA cannot implement a first-best IEA. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999
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