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Designing coalition-proof mechanisms for P2P energy trading

Author

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  • Zhao, Chen
  • Han, Dong
  • Lu, Zhuoxin
  • Xia, Shiwei

Abstract

The promotion of distributed energy resources (DERs) and the exhaustion of fossil energy have facilitated the emergence of peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading. Toward this trend, this study develops an energy trading mechanism among autonomous prosumers to achieve total valuation maximization, which incorporates the carbon emission cost, battery degradation cost, and user discomfort load cost. From the perspective of payment, the core-selecting mechanism is employed to eliminate the effect of coalition manipulation phenomena, such as shill bidding and collusion, and incentive participators' truth-telling without the disclosure of privacy. Meanwhile, distinguishing from conventional distributed algorithms, we leverage the alternating optimization procedure (AOP) approach embedded with the sharing form Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) to mitigate the non-convexity issue of the proposed energy trading model. Compared with current research, the proposed mechanism performance is validated by extensive case studies. The results illustrate that the proposed mechanism exhibits computational efficiency and coalition-proof characteristics, which economically benefits for prosumers and facilitate the construction of a low-carbon community.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhao, Chen & Han, Dong & Lu, Zhuoxin & Xia, Shiwei, 2025. "Designing coalition-proof mechanisms for P2P energy trading," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:renene:v:239:y:2025:i:c:s096014812402175x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.renene.2024.122107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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