Cross-border shopping in a federal economy
The purpose of this paper is to consider an economy that incorporates cross-border shopping and where the different levels of government are concerned with the well-being of their citizens. We assume a federal economy with a central government and two regions with specific characteristics. Two kinds of externalities, horizontal and vertical, arise and we show the possibilities of internalising them. With the governments of symmetric regions behaving as Nash players, they would optimally set their tax rates and replicate the unitary nation optimum. Finally, we show how the central government as a Stackelberg leader can adjust its fiscal instruments so that the tax externalities are also internalised.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2001.
" A Simple Model of Commodity Taxation and Cross-Border Shopping,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(4), pages 599-623, December.
- Søren Bo Nielsen, "undated". "A Simple Model of Commodity Taxation and Cross-Border Shopping," EPRU Working Paper Series 98-18, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Nielsen, Søren Bo, 1998. "A simple model of commodity taxation and cross-border shopping," Working Papers 13-1998, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
- You-Qiang Wang, 1999. "Commodity Taxes under Fiscal Competition: Stackelberg Equilibrium and Optimality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 974-981, September.
- Hoyt, William H., 2001. "Tax Policy Coordination, Vertical Externalities, and Optimal Taxation in a System of Hierarchical Governments," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 491-516, November.
- Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "Interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 435-457, March.
- Ohsawa, Yoshiaki, 1999. "Cross-border shopping and commodity tax competition among governments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 33-51, January.
- Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
- Michael Keen, 1997. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Working Papers 97/173, International Monetary Fund.
- Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-892, September.
- Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.