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The role of asymmetric innovation’s sizes in technology licensing under partial vertical integration

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  • Sánchez, M.
  • Nerja, A.

Abstract

In this paper, we compare the scenarios of exclusive licenses and cross-licenses under the existence of partial vertical integration. To do this, a successive duopoly model is proposed, with two owners and two firms competing in a differentiated product market. Each technology owner has a share in one of the competing firms, so that competition is also extended to the upstream R&D sector. We propose a novel analysis where differences in the size of their innovation process are allowed, extending the results in Sánchez et al. (2021). We find that the cross-licensing scenario is preferred when the size of the innovation is small; this occurs regardless of the participation in the competing companies and how many innovate. If the innovation is very large, the owners may be better off with exclusive licenses.

Suggested Citation

  • Sánchez, M. & Nerja, A., 2024. "The role of asymmetric innovation’s sizes in technology licensing under partial vertical integration," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:78:y:2024:i:2:s109094432400022x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2024.100958
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patent licensing; Exclusive licenses; Market for technology; Asymmetric innovation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing

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