On The Superiority Of Fixed Fee Over Auction In Technology Licensing
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DOI: 10.1111/manc.2013.81.issue-3
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Cited by:
- Lin, Yen-Ju, 2022. "Consumer welfare, licensing, and exclusive dealing with vertically- and horizontally-differentiated products," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 147-158.
- Ismail Saglam, 2023.
"Licensing cost‐reducing innovations under supply function competition,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(1), pages 180-201, January.
- Saglam, Ismail, 2021. "Licensing Cost-Reducing Innovations Under Supply Function Competition," MPRA Paper 107293, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sánchez, M. & Nerja, A., 2024.
"The role of asymmetric innovation’s sizes in technology licensing under partial vertical integration,"
Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2).
- Sánchez, Mariola & Nerja, Adrian, 2024. "The role of asymmetric innovation’s sizes in technology licensing under partial vertical integration," MPRA Paper 120829, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kim, Seung-Leul & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2016. "The licensing of eco-technology under emission taxation: Fixed fee vs. auction," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 343-357.
- Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2024. "On the size of innovation and selling versus licensing," MPRA Paper 122731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alessio D’Amato & Roberta Sestini, 2026.
"Buying or Performing Abatement: Environmental Policy and Welfare When Commitment Is (Not) Credible,"
Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 12(1), pages 513-544, March.
- Alessio D’Amato & Roberta Sestini, 2023. "Buying or performing abatement: environmental policy and welfare when commitment is (not) credible," SEEDS Working Papers 0423, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, revised Nov 2023.
- Chien-Shu Tsai & Ting-Chung Tsai & Po-Sheng Ko & Chien-Hui Lee & Jen-Yao Lee & Yu-Lin Wang, 2019. "On the Sustainability of Technology Licensing Under Asymmetric Information Game," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(24), pages 1-15, December.
- Mariola Sánchez & José Antonio Belso‐Martínez & María José López‐Sánchez & Adrián Nerja, 2022. "Incentives to exclusive and non‐exclusive technology licensing under partial vertical integration," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(2), pages 171-189, March.
- Kim, Seung-Leul & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2016. "Environmental policy on the fixed-fee licensing of eco-technology under foreign penetration," MPRA Paper 84412, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Creane, Anthony & Ko, Chiu Yu & Konishi, Hideo, 2013.
"Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 254-268.
- Anthony Creane & Chiu Yu Ko & Hideo Konishi, 2011. "Choosing a Licensee from Heterogeneous Rivals," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 779, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Apr 2013.
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