Macroeconomic shocks and regulatory dilemmas: The affordability and sustainability constraints and the Argentine default experience
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- Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988.
"Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-1097, December.
- Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 1985. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 1673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chisari, Omar & Estache, Antonio, 1991. "Universal service obligations in utility concession contracts and the needs of the poor in Argentina's privatization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2250, The World Bank.
- CHISARI Omar O. & ESTACHE Antonio & LAMBARDI Germán & ROMERO Carlos A., "undated". "Devaluation and Public Services: Trade-Offs and Remedial Policies. A CGE Model for Argentina," EcoMod2003 330700036, EcoMod.
- Chisari, Omar & Estache, Antonio & Romero, Carlos, 1999. "Winners and Losers from the Privatization and Regulation of Utilities: Lessons from a General Equilibrium Model of Argentina," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 13(2), pages 357-378, May.
- Antonio Estache & Omar Chisari & C. Romero, 1999. "Winners and Losers from the Privatization and Regulation of Utilities: Lessons from a General Equilibrium Model of Argentina," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/44005, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre & Wibaut, Serge, 1989. " Optimal Commodity Taxation and Tax Reform under Unemployment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 91(3), pages 547-563.
- Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P. & Wibaut, S., 1986. "Optimal commodity taxation and tax reform under unemployment," CORE Discussion Papers 1986031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Omar Chisari & Antonio Estache & Catherine Waddams Price, 2003. "Access by the poor in Latin America's utility reform: subsidies and service obligations," Chapters,in: Utility Privatization and Regulation, chapter 2 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Chisari, Omar O. & Estache, Antonio & Waddams Price, Catherine, 2001. "Access by the Poor in Latin America's Utility Reform Subsidies and Service Obligations," WIDER Working Paper Series 075, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Antonio Estache & Omar Chisari & Catherine Waddams Price, 2003. "Access by the poor in Latin America's utility reform: Subsidies and service obligations," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/44068, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Clarke, George R.G. & Wallsten, Scott J., 2002. "Universal(ly bad) service - providing infrastructure services to rural and poor urban consumers," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2868, The World Bank. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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