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Can by-product lobbying firms compete?


  • Pecorino, Paul


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  • Pecorino, Paul, 2001. "Can by-product lobbying firms compete?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 377-397, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:82:y:2001:i:3:p:377-397

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 652-660, June.
    2. John Morgan, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 761-784.
    3. Krugman, Paul, 1980. "Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 950-959, December.
    4. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    5. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    6. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    7. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    8. John Posnett & Todd Sandler, 1986. "Joint Supply and the Finance of Charitable Activity," Public Finance Review, , vol. 14(2), pages 209-222, April.
    9. George J. Stigler, 1974. "Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 359-365, Autumn.
    10. Krugman, Paul R., 1979. "Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 469-479, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Pecorino, 2015. "Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 243-262, March.
    2. Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Moral hazard and free riding in collective action," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(2), pages 197-219, February.
    3. Pecorino, Paul, 2010. "By-product lobbying with rival public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 114-124, March.

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