When are anonymous congestion charges consistent with marginal cost pricing?
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- Richard Arnott & Marvin Kraus, 1997. "When are Anonymous Congestion Charges Consistent with Marginal Cost Pricing?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 354., Boston College Department of Economics.
- Richard Arnott & Marvin Kraus, 1994. "When Are Anonymous Congestion Charges Consistent with Marginal Cost Pricing?," NBER Technical Working Papers 0154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
- Arnott Richard & Kraus Marvin, 1995. "Financing Capacity in the Bottleneck Model," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 272-290, November.
- Henderson, J. Vernon, 1981. "The economics of staggered work hours," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 349-364, May.
- Berglas, Eitan & Pines, David, 1981. "Clubs, local public goods and transportation models : A synthesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 141-162.
- Mohring, Herbert, 1970. "The Peak Load Problem with Increasing Returns and Pricing Constraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(4), pages 693-705, September.
- Arnott, Richard & de Palma, Andre & Lindsey, Robin, 1993. "A Structural Model of Peak-Period Congestion: A Traffic Bottleneck with Elastic Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 161-179, March.
- Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-260, May.
- Braeutigam, Ronald R., 1989. "Optimal policies for natural monopolies," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1289-1346 Elsevier.
- Dorfman, Robert, 1969. "An Economic Interpretation of Optimal Control Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(5), pages 817-831, December.
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- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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