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Equilibrium formation of class action suits

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  • Che, Yeon-Koo

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  • Che, Yeon-Koo, 1996. "Equilibrium formation of class action suits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 339-361, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:62:y:1996:i:3:p:339-361
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 557-566.
    3. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 404-415.
    4. Lewis Kornhauser, 1983. "Control of conflicts of interest in class-action suits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 145-175, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kathryn Spier & Xinyu Hua, "undated". "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1081, American Law & Economics Association.
    2. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2011. "A dynamic model of lawsuit joinder and settlement," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, pages 471-494.
    3. Bruno Deffains & Eric Langlais, 2011. "Informational externalities and settlements in mass tort litigations," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, pages 241-262.
    4. Ingo Vogelsang & Nishal Ramphal & Stephen Carroll & Nicholas Pace, 2007. "An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 87-104, August.
    5. Andrew F. Daughety & Reinganum F. Reinganum, 2014. "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 14-00005, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    6. Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, 2005. "Decision Rules in a Judicial Hierarchy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(2), pages 264-264, June.
    7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2009. "On the superiority of damage averaging in the case of strict liability," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 138-142, June.
    9. Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, 2004. "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," NBER Working Papers 10943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Deffains, Bruno & Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Informational externalities and informational sharing in class action suits," MPRA Paper 4846, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Tim Friehe, 2007. "On the incentive effects of damage averaging in tort law," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7.
    12. Spier, Kathryn E., 2001. "The Use of “Most-Favored-Nation†Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt7hm4d39g, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    13. Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 4-23, March.
    14. Yeon-Koo Che, 2002. "The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 549-576, May.
    15. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Mass Torts and the Incentives for Suit, Settlement, and Trial," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0713, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

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