Endogenous audits, uncertainty, and taxpayer assistance services: Theory and experiments
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More about this item
KeywordsIndividual income tax; Taxpayer assistance services; Endogenous audits; Tax reporting and enforcement; Experimental methods;
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
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