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Social mobility and political stability

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  • Lyu, Weicheng

Abstract

This paper investigates the occurrence of revolutions in an economy consisting of elites and ordinary citizens. In the economy, elites obtain a disproportionate share of income and maintain their children’s status within the elite class by nepotism. Meanwhile, nepotism obstructs the path for capable individuals to enter the elite class, thereby enhancing the citizens’ relative advantage in capable manpower. In response, citizens may resort to revolutions for a larger share of national income. As the citizens’ relative advantage rises, the difficulty of launching a revolution declines; once it reaches some threshold, a revolution occurs. However, social mobility imposes institutional constraints on nepotism, thus playing a pivotal role in determining the occurrence of revolutions. In this context, we offer an explanation for the periodicity of dynasties and propose an optimal scheme to increase social mobility and prevent revolutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Lyu, Weicheng, 2025. "Social mobility and political stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:87:y:2025:i:c:s0176268025000254
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102665
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social mobility; Institution; Nepotism; Revolutions; Historical periodicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

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