An n-person battle of sexes game
The n-person Battle of Sexes game is first introduced. The game’s properties are discussed and payoff functions are modeled under the main assumption that players’ payoffs are based on whether they like their choices or not and also on how many other players have the same choices. Linear payoff functions are assumed and the existence of the Nash equilibrium is examined. The dependence of the equilibrium on model parameters is also analyzed.
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Volume (Year): 387 (2008)
Issue (Month): 14 ()
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- Cooper, Russell & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1993. "Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1303-16, December.
- Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
- Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1989. "Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 568-587, Winter.
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