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Imperfect information, multiple shocks, and policy's signaling role

  • Berkelmans, Leon

In multiple shock models, when agents have imperfect information they attempt to infer a shock's type, in addition to its size. In this environment, monetary policy plays an important signaling role. This paper highlights this signaling role by showing that conclusions from imperfect information monetary models are sensitive to the number of shocks included. With multiple shocks, contractionary monetary policy can initially increase inflation and delay the eventual disinflation. Moreover, multiple shocks can result in destabilizing price flexibility, while optimal policy's response to one shock will depend on the existence of other shocks, contrary to a typical linear-quadratic framework.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 58 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 373-386

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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:58:y:2011:i:4:p:373-386
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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