IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v118y2021icp54-86.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal policy with general signal extraction

Author

Listed:
  • Hauk, Esther
  • Lanteri, Andrea
  • Marcet, Albert

Abstract

Most available results on optimal decisions under partial information are derived under “separation”. But this principle does not always hold. We derive a non-standard first order condition of optimality from first principles when signal extraction and optimal policy must be jointly determined. This allows us to solve a model of optimal fiscal policy where separation does not apply. Tax smoothing prevails in normal times, but taxes respond strongly in recessions. This non-linearity arises because signal extraction interacts differently with optimal policy depending on the value of the observed signals. Existing results based on the “separation principle” follow as special cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Hauk, Esther & Lanteri, Andrea & Marcet, Albert, 2021. "Optimal policy with general signal extraction," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 54-86.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:118:y:2021:i:c:p:54-86
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.01.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393221000027
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.01.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Manuel Amador & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2010. "Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 866-907.
    2. Adam, Klaus, 2004. "On the relation between robust and Bayesian decision making," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 2105-2117, September.
    3. Ellison, Martin & Valla, Natacha, 2001. "Learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 153-171, August.
    4. Nimark, Kristoffer, 2008. "Monetary policy with signal extraction from the bond market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1389-1400, November.
    5. Wieland, Volker, 2000. "Learning by doing and the value of optimal experimentation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 501-534, April.
    6. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2009. "Policy with Dispersed Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 11-60, March.
    7. Leonardo Melosi, 2017. "Signalling Effects of Monetary Policy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 853-884.
    8. Mirman, Leonard J & Samuelson, Larry & Urbano, Amparo, 1993. "Monopoly Experimentation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 549-563, August.
    9. Swanson, Eric T., 2006. "Optimal nonlinear policy: signal extraction with a non-normal prior," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 185-203, February.
    10. Svensson, Lars E. O. & Woodford, Michael, 2004. "Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 661-690, January.
    11. Svensson, Lars E. O. & Woodford, Michael, 2003. "Indicator variables for optimal policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 691-720, April.
    12. Wieland, Volker, 2000. "Monetary policy, parameter uncertainty and optimal learning," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 199-228, August.
    13. Baxter, Brad & Graham, Liam & Wright, Stephen, 2011. "Invertible and non-invertible information sets in linear rational expectations models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 295-311, March.
    14. Nimark, Kristoffer, 2008. "Dynamic pricing and imperfect common knowledge," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 365-382, March.
    15. Lars Peter Hansen & Thomas J Sargent, 2014. "Three Types of Ambiguity," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: UNCERTAINTY WITHIN ECONOMIC MODELS, chapter 11, pages 379-430, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    16. Aoki, Kosuke, 2003. "On the optimal monetary policy response to noisy indicators," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 501-523, April.
    17. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2018. "Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Signal Value of Market Prices," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 108, pages 572-577, May.
    18. Pearlman, Joseph & Currie, David & Levine, Paul, 1986. "Rational expectations models with partial information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 90-105, April.
    19. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2010. "The New Dynamic Public Finance," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9222.
    20. Stefanie Stantcheva, 2015. "Learning and (or) Doing: Human Capital Investments and Optimal Taxation," NBER Working Papers 21381, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn & Veldkamp, Laura, 2006. "Learning asymmetries in real business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 753-772, May.
    22. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 55-93.
    23. Pearlman, Joseph G., 1992. "Reputational and nonreputational policies under partial information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 339-357, April.
    24. Hansen, Lars Peter & Sargent, Thomas J., 2012. "Three types of ambiguity," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(5), pages 422-445.
    25. Alex Clymo & Andrea Lanteri, 2020. "Fiscal Policy with Limited-Time Commitment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(627), pages 623-652.
    26. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
    27. Brad Baxter & Liam Graham & Stephen Wright, 2007. "The Endogenous Kalman Filter," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0719, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    28. S. Rao Aiyagari & Albert Marcet & Thomas J. Sargent & Juha Seppala, 2002. "Optimal Taxation without State-Contingent Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1220-1254, December.
    29. Prescott, Edward C, 1972. "The Multi-Period Control Problem Under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(6), pages 1043-1058, November.
    30. Kiefer, Nicholas M & Nyarko, Yaw, 1989. "Optimal Control of an Unknown Linear Process with Learning," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(3), pages 571-586, August.
    31. Townsend, Robert M, 1983. "Forecasting the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 546-588, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Dávila & Ansgar Walther, 2023. "Prudential Policy with Distorted Beliefs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(7), pages 1967-2006, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrea Lanteri & Albert Marcet & Esther Hauk, 2014. "Optimal Policy with Endogenous Signal Extraction," 2014 Meeting Papers 677, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Guido Lorenzoni, 2009. "A Theory of Demand Shocks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2050-2084, December.
    3. Svensson, Lars E.O., 2010. "Inflation Targeting," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1237-1302, Elsevier.
    4. Thomas Lubik & Christian Matthes & Elmar Mertens, 2023. "Indeterminacy and Imperfect Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 49, pages 37-57, July.
    5. Tim Willems, 2017. "Actively Learning by Pricing: A Model of an Experimenting Seller," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2216-2239, September.
    6. George-Marios Angeletos & Jennifer La'O, 2010. "Noisy Business Cycles," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24, pages 319-378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Huo, Zhen & Pedroni, Marcelo, 2023. "Dynamic information aggregation: Learning from the past," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 107-124.
    8. Mäkinen, Taneli & Ohl, Björn, 2015. "Information acquisition and learning from prices over the business cycle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 585-633.
    9. Baxter, Brad & Graham, Liam & Wright, Stephen, 2011. "Invertible and non-invertible information sets in linear rational expectations models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 295-311, March.
    10. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
    11. David Kendrick & Hans Amman, 2006. "A Classification System for Economic Stochastic Control Models," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 27(4), pages 453-481, June.
    12. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Stephen Wright & Bo Yang, 2023. "Imperfect Information and Hidden Dynamics," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1223, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    13. Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman & Stephen Wright & Bo Yang, 2019. "Information, VARs and DSGE Models," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1619, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    14. Svensson, Lars E. O. & Woodford, Michael, 2004. "Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 661-690, January.
    15. Angeletos, George-Marios & Iovino, Luigi & La'O, Jennifer, 2020. "Learning over the business cycle: Policy implications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    16. Holden, Tom, 2008. "Rational macroeconomic learning in linear expectational models," MPRA Paper 10872, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Nimark, Kristoffer P., 2003. "Indicator Accuracy and Monetary Policy: Is Ignorance Bliss?," Working Paper Series 157, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    18. Jia, Chengcheng, 2023. "The informational effect of monetary policy and the case for policy commitment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    19. Lauri Kajanoja, 2004. "Money as an indicator variable for monetary policy when money demand is forward looking," Macroeconomics 0405003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. George-Marios Angeletos, 2018. "Frictional Coordination," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 563-603.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal policy; Partial information; Calculus of variations; Fiscal policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:118:y:2021:i:c:p:54-86. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.