On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
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References listed on IDEAS
- Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1371-1399, November.
- Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
- Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, July.
- Chamberland, Marc & Cressman, Ross, 2000. "An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 319-326, February.
- Ely, Jeffrey C. & Sandholm, William H., 2005. "Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 83-109, October.
- P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Yi Tao & Jing-Jing Xu & Cong Li & Ross Cressman, 2014. "Dominance Hierarchies Induce a Population’s Full Cooperation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 432-447, December.
- Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Jiabin Wu, 2016. "The Interplay of Cultural Aversion and Assortativity for the Emergence of Cooperation," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 121, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
- Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli & Jiabin Wuz, 2016. "The Interplay of Cultural Aversion and Assortativity for the Emergence of Cooperation," Department of Economics 0084, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
- repec:eee:eecrev:v:102:y:2018:i:c:p:1-18 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jean Rabanal & Daniel Friedman, 2014. "Incomplete Information, Dynamic Stability and the Evolution of Preferences: Two Examples," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 448-467, December.
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KeywordsIncomplete information games Evolution Replicator dynamic Dynamic stability;
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