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Dominance Hierarchies Induce a Population’s Full Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Yi Tao
  • Jing-Jing Xu
  • Cong Li
  • Ross Cressman

Abstract

Evolution of cooperation is still a puzzle in evolutionary and socio biology. Based on the asymmetric interactions in a dominance hierarchy system, a simple theoretical framework is developed to reveal the effect of “induced cooperation” (i.e., the cooperative behavior of subordinate individuals to dominant individuals) on the evolution of cooperation. Extending the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, we define the concept of the defection cost of subordinate individuals to measure the effect of induced cooperation, i.e., a subordinate defector will incur a cost when it plays against a dominant defector. The analysis of the repeated PD game with linear dominance hierarchy and with cyclic dominance hierarchy shows clearly that induced cooperation of subordinate individuals may lead to a population’s full cooperation, and that the coexistence of cooperation and defection in a population with hierarchy dominance is possible. Our results are the first step to develop a new theoretical approach for understanding the emergence of cooperation; namely, that induced cooperation is one of the most important forces driving the evolution of cooperation as pointed out by May (in May R, McLean A (eds) Theoretical ecology 3rd edn., ( 2007 )). Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Yi Tao & Jing-Jing Xu & Cong Li & Ross Cressman, 2014. "Dominance Hierarchies Induce a Population’s Full Cooperation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 432-447, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:4:y:2014:i:4:p:432-447
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-014-0126-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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