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Evolution in Symmetric Incomplete Information Games

Author

Listed:
  • Erwin Amann

    (University of Duisburg-Essen)

  • Alex Possajennikov

    (University of Nottingham)

Abstract

The paper compares two models of evolution in symmetric two-player games with incomplete information. One model postulates that the type of a player is fixed, and evolution works within types. In the other model type-contingent strategies evolve. In the case of two types and two strategies it is shown that the stability properties of stationary states are the same under the two dynamics when payoffs do not depend on the type of the other player, but may differ when they do.

Suggested Citation

  • Erwin Amann & Alex Possajennikov, 2004. "Evolution in Symmetric Incomplete Information Games," Game Theory and Information 0409004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0409004
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0409/0409004.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    2. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, January.
    3. Chamberland, Marc & Cressman, Ross, 2000. "An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 319-326, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    incomplete information games; evolution; stability;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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