IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v46y2003i2p193-205.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games

Author

Listed:
  • Holzman, Ron
  • Law-yone (Lev-tov), Nissan

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Holzman, Ron & Law-yone (Lev-tov), Nissan, 2003. "Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 193-205, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:46:y:2003:i:2:p:193-205
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-4896(03)00076-3
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hideo Konishi, 2004. "Uniqueness of User Equilibrium in Transportation Networks with Heterogeneous Commuters," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 315-330, August.
    2. Hohzaki, Ryusuke & Iida, Koji, 1997. "Optimal strategy of route and look for the path constrained search problem with reward criterion," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 236-249, July.
    3. Igal Milchtaich, 2000. "Generic Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Large Crowding Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(3), pages 349-364, August.
    4. Holzman, Ron & Law-Yone, Nissan, 1997. "Strong Equilibrium in Congestion Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 85-101, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kuniavsky, Sergey & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2013. "Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 499-503.
    2. Satoru Fujishige & Michel X. Goemans & Tobias Harks & Britta Peis & Rico Zenklusen, 2017. "Matroids Are Immune to Braess’ Paradox," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 42(3), pages 745-761, August.
    3. Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 651-669, August.
    4. Igal Milchtaich, 2015. "Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 515-541, August.
    5. Epstein, Amir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay, 2009. "Efficient graph topologies in network routing games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 115-125, May.
    6. T. Werth & H. Sperber & S. Krumke, 2014. "Computation of equilibria and the price of anarchy in bottleneck congestion games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 22(4), pages 687-712, December.
    7. Andelman, Nir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay, 2009. "Strong price of anarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 289-317, March.
    8. Epstein, Amir & Feldman, Michal & Mansour, Yishay, 2009. "Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 51-68, September.
    9. Xujin Chen & Zhuo Diao & Xiaodong Hu, 2022. "On weak Pareto optimality of nonatomic routing networks," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 1705-1723, October.
    10. Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Social learning in nonatomic routing games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 221-233.
    11. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2017. "Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 1-12.
    12. Xujin Chen & Zhuo Diao & Xiaodong Hu, 0. "On weak Pareto optimality of nonatomic routing networks," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-19.
    13. Igal Milchtaich, 2021. "Internalization of social cost in congestion games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 717-760, March.
    14. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2014. "Noncooperative Market Allocation and the Formation of Downtown," Discussion Paper Series dp663, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    15. Kazuo Murota, 2016. "Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 151-273, December.
    16. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2014. "Cascading to Equilibrium: Hydraulic Computation of Equilibria in Resource Selection Games," Discussion Paper Series dp673, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    17. Ron Holzman & Dov Monderer, 2015. "Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 647-666, August.
    18. Milchtaich, Igal, 2006. "Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 321-346, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Igal Milchtaich, 2003. "Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks," Working Papers 2003-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    2. Ryo Kawasaki & Hideo Konishi & Junki Yukawa, 2023. "Equilibria in bottleneck games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 649-685, September.
    3. Cominetti, Roberto & Dose, Valerio & Scarsini, Marco, 2024. "Monotonicity of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 316(2), pages 754-766.
    4. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2014. "Noncooperative Market Allocation and the Formation of Downtown," Discussion Paper Series dp663, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Meunier, Frédéric & Pradeau, Thomas, 2014. "The uniqueness property for networks with several origin–destination pairs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(1), pages 245-256.
    6. Igal Milchtaich, 2005. "Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 30(1), pages 225-244, February.
    7. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2014. "Cascading to Equilibrium: Hydraulic Computation of Equilibria in Resource Selection Games," Discussion Paper Series dp673, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    8. Di Feng & Bettina Klaus, 2022. "Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 61-76, March.
    9. Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, 2004. "Using Hit Rate Tests to Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement: Vehicle Searches in Wichita," NBER Working Papers 10947, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Masiero, Lorenzo & Maggi, Rico, 2012. "Estimation of indirect cost and evaluation of protective measures for infrastructure vulnerability: A case study on the transalpine transport corridor," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 13-21.
    11. Mark Voorneveld & Peter Borm & Freek Van Megen & Stef Tijs & Giovanni Facchini, 1999. "Congestion Games And Potentials Reconsidered," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(03n04), pages 283-299.
    12. Berdica, Katja, 2002. "An introduction to road vulnerability: what has been done, is done and should be done," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 117-127, April.
    13. Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination," Economic Research Papers 269414, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    14. Hideo Konishi, 2004. "Uniqueness of User Equilibrium in Transportation Networks with Heterogeneous Commuters," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(3), pages 315-330, August.
    15. Xujin Chen & Zhuo Diao & Xiaodong Hu, 2022. "On weak Pareto optimality of nonatomic routing networks," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 1705-1723, October.
    16. Le Breton, Michel & Shapoval, Alexander & Weber, Shlomo, 2021. "A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 41-46.
    17. Chen, Enxian & Qiao, Lei & Sun, Xiang & Sun, Yeneng, 2022. "Robust perfect equilibrium in large games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    18. André de Palma & Stef Proost & Ravi Seshadri & Moshe Ben-Akiva, 2016. "Tolls Versus Mobility Permits: A Comparative Analysis," Working Papers hal-01397582, HAL.
    19. Page Jr., Frank H. & Wooders, Myrna, 2009. "Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 462-487, May.
    20. Zhan Wang & Jinpeng Ma & Hongwei Zhang, 2023. "Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 8(1), pages 1-55, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:46:y:2003:i:2:p:193-205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.