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Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard

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  • Magill, Michael
  • Quinzii, Martine

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  • Magill, Michael & Quinzii, Martine, 2002. "Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 149-190, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:1-2:p:149-190
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    11. Magill, Michael & Shafer, Wayne, 1991. "Incomplete markets," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: W. Hildenbrand & H. Sonnenschein (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 30, pages 1523-1614, Elsevier.
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    20. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    21. Marshall, John M, 1976. "Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(5), pages 880-890, December.
    22. Helpman, Elhanan & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1975. "On moral hazard in general equilibrium theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 8-23, February.
    23. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    24. Brander, James A & Spencer, Barbara J, 1989. "Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(4), pages 833-849, November.
    25. Steinar Ekern & Robert Wilson, 1974. "On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(1), pages 171-180, Spring.
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    27. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "The effects of moral hazard on asset prices when financial markets are complete," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 39-56, February.
    28. Unknown, 2001. "General Discussion," Proceedings of the 6th Agricultural and Food Policy Systems Information Workshop, 2000: Trade Liberalization Under NAFTA: Report Card on Agriculture 16839, Farm Foundation, Agricultural and Food Policy Systems Information Workshops.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Quiggin, John & Chambers, Robert G., 2006. "Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard and flexible technology," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 358-363, June.
    2. Wolf Wagner, 2007. "International Risk Sharing and Government Moral Hazard," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 577-598, November.
    3. Wolf Wagner, 2010. "Divestment, Entrepreneurial Incentives, and the Life Cycle of the Firm," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(5-6), pages 591-611.
    4. Guido Ruta & Piero Gottardi, 2009. "Equilibrium corporate finance," 2009 Meeting Papers 149, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Bisin, Alberto; & Gottardi, Piero; & Ruta, Guido, 2014. "Equilibrium corporate finance and intermediation," Economics Working Papers ECO2014/09, European University Institute.
    6. repec:got:cegedp:78 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Branko Urosevic, 2001. "Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes," Economics Working Papers 787, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2004.
    8. Viral V. Acharya & Alberto Bisin, 2009. "Managerial hedging, equity ownership, and firm value," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 47-77, March.
    9. Blonski, Matthias & von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf, 2008. "Excess returns and the distinguished player paradox," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 78, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    10. Wolfgang Buchholz & Jonas Frank & Hans-Dieter Karl & Johannes Pfeiffer & Karen Pittel & Ursula Triebswetter & Jochen Habermann & Wolfgang Mauch & Thomas Staudacher, 2012. "Die Zukunft der Energiemärkte: Ökonomische Analyse und Bewertung von Potenzialen und Handlungsmöglichkeiten," ifo Forschungsberichte, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 57, October.
    11. Magill, Michael & Quinzii, Martine, 2008. "Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 785-806, July.
    12. Alberto Bisin & Gian Luca Clementi & Piero Gottardi, 2014. "Capital Structure and Hedging Demand with Incomplete Markets," NBER Working Papers 20345, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Calcagno, R. & Wagner, W.B., 2003. "The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium under Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper 2003-107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Matthias Blonski & Ulf Lilienfeld-Toal, 2023. "Moral hazard with excess returns," Mathematics and Financial Economics, Springer, volume 17, number 6, June.
    15. Calcagno, R. & Wagner, W.B., 2003. "The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium under Moral Hazard," Other publications TiSEM 373f263e-04ad-4f4c-9654-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Florackis, Chrisostomos & Kostakis, Alexandros & Ozkan, Aydin, 2009. "Managerial ownership and performance," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(12), pages 1350-1357, December.
    17. Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2005. "An Equilibrium Model of Managerial Compensation," IEPR Working Papers 05.22, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR).
    18. Magill, Michael & Quinzii, Martine, 2008. "Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 785-806, July.
    19. Wolf Wagner, 2010. "Divestment, Entrepreneurial Incentives, and the Life Cycle of the Firm," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(5‐6), pages 591-611, June.
    20. Calcagno, Riccardo & Wagner, Wolf, 2006. "Dispersed initial ownership and the efficiency of the stock market under moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 36-45, February.

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