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Moral hazard and general equilibrium in large economies

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  • Marcos B. Lisboa

    () (Escola da Pós-Graduação em Economia, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22253-900, BRAZIL)

Abstract

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk, aggregate uncertainty and moral hazard. There is a large number of households, each facing two individual states of nature in the second period. These states differ solely in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period each household chooses a non-observable action. Higher levels of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower levels of utility. Households' utilities are assumed to be separable in action and the aggregate uncertainty is independent of the individual risk. Insurance is supplied by a collection of firms who behave strategically and maximize expected profits taking into account that each household's optimal choice of action is a function of the offered contract. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the appropriate versions of both welfare theorems hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcos B. Lisboa, 2001. "Moral hazard and general equilibrium in large economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(3), pages 555-575.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:18:y:2001:i:3:p:555-575 Note: Received: December 7, 1998; revised version: October 25, 1999
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Calcagno, R. & Wagner, W.B., 2003. "The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium under Moral Hazard," Discussion Paper 2003-107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Hellwig, Martin F., 2005. "Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 1-38, January.
    3. Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2009. "The probability approach to general equilibrium with production," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 1-41.
    4. PANACCIONE, Luca, 2006. "Inefficiency of competitive equilibrium with hidden action and financial markets," CORE Discussion Papers 2006096, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Alessandro Fedele & Luca Panaccione, 2015. "Pay package reshuffling and managerial incentives: A principal-agent analysis," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS28, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.
    6. Kilenthong, Weerachart T. & Townsend, Robert M., 2011. "Information-constrained optima with retrading: An externality and its market-based solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1042-1077, May.
    7. Magill, Michael & Quinzii, Martine, 2002. "Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 149-190, September.
    8. Magill, Michael & Quinzii, Martine, 2008. "Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 785-806, July.
    9. Calcagno, Riccardo & Wagner, Wolf, 2006. "Dispersed initial ownership and the efficiency of the stock market under moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 36-45, February.
    10. Michael Magill & Martine Quinzii, 2009. "The probability approach to general equilibrium with production," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 1-41.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral hazard; General equilibrium; Welfare theorems.;

    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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