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Mitigating conflicts in the implementation of intensive land use policies: Insights from a tripartite evolutionary game model

Author

Listed:
  • Zhang, Shouguo
  • Zhang, Jianjun
  • Dai, Yixin
  • Zhang, Ling

Abstract

Various levels of Chinese governments have implemented several intensive land use policies (ILUP) to manage the unending extensive urbanization. However, the aspect of conflicting interests and goals at the national level (NL), local levels (LL) and land users (LU) creates resistance to the implementation of ILUP. Recognizing and studying the conflicting nature of the three parties is beneficial to mitigate the challenges of policy implementation. This paper aims to clarify the conflict mechanisms among actors in intensive land use and provide insights into mitigating conflicts in the ILUP transmission process. A combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches based on tripartite evolutionary game model were used to address the antagonism in policy implementation. The findings suggest that: (1) Policy transmission mainly led by the NL, while collaboration between the LL and LU can facilitate such transmission. (2) The interaction between LL and LU exhibits an asymmetric impact. Notably, increasing the participation intention of LU alone (20 %-40 %) has a greater effect compared to LL (40 %-60 %). (3) Enforcement of punitive measures (40 %-60 %) proves to be more efficient than rewarding measures (over 60 %) with regards to policy transmission. Moreover, direct role of NL to LL facilitates cooperation. (4) The priority of the mechanism of costs-benefits variables is as follows: reducing policy implementation costs of LL (around 15 %) > decreasing costs for LU = increasing benefits for LU (10 %-20 %) > increasing policy implementation benefits of LL (40 %-60 %) > lowering supervision costs of NL (around 100 %) > increasing external benefits of NL. This paper takes game theory to recognize and mitigate the contradictory relationship between the three parties, and provides insightful suggestions for a more effective future policy evolution.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Shouguo & Zhang, Jianjun & Dai, Yixin & Zhang, Ling, 2025. "Mitigating conflicts in the implementation of intensive land use policies: Insights from a tripartite evolutionary game model," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:150:y:2025:i:c:s0264837724004137
    DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2024.107460
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