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I want YOU! An experiment studying motivational effects when assigning distributive power

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  • Brandts, Jordi
  • Guth, Werner
  • Stiehler, Andreas

Abstract

Will the fact that a person is selected among others on the basis of personal information affect that person's behavior? In our experiment participants first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game: one of the three players decides, after inspecting the personality questionnaires, between an outside option and granting allocation power over a pie to one of the other two players. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distribution power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Results show that knowingly selected allocators keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones. We also find evidence that knowingly selected allocators treat selectors more generously than the third player. However, these effects become weaker over time.
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  • Brandts, Jordi & Guth, Werner & Stiehler, Andreas, 2006. "I want YOU! An experiment studying motivational effects when assigning distributive power," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 1-17, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:13:y:2006:i:1:p:1-17
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    Cited by:

    1. James Cox & Maroš Servátka & Radovan Vadovič, 2010. "Saliency of outside options in the lost wallet game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(1), pages 66-74, March.
    2. Christian Korth & J. Philipp Reiß, 2014. "Vacuous Information Affects Bargaining," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 921-936, July.
    3. Maroš Servátka & Radovan Vadovič, 2008. "Does Fairness of the Outside Option Matter?," Working Papers in Economics 08/06, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    4. Natalia Montinari & Antonio Nicolò & Regine Oexl, 2012. "Mediocrity and induced reciprocity," Working Papers 2012-19, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    5. Viola Ackfeld & Werner Güth, 2019. "Personal Information Disclosure under Competition for Benefits: Is Sharing Caring?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    6. Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde & Hromek, Kristijan & Kleinknecht, Janina & Ludwig, Sandra, 2023. "Reciprocal reactions to (in)transparent task assignments: An experimental investigation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    7. Hodaka Morita & Maroš Servátka, 2018. "Investment in Outside Options as Opportunistic Behavior: An Experimental Investigation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(2), pages 457-484, October.
    8. Luca Corazzini, Sebastian Kube, Michel André Maréchal, 2007. "Towards a Behavioral Public Choice: Guilt-Aversion and Accountability in the Lab," ISLA Working Papers 27, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    9. Drazen, Allan & Ozbay, Erkut Y., 2019. "Does “being chosen to lead” induce non-selfish behavior? Experimental evidence on reciprocity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 13-21.
    10. Peter Bußwolder & Swetlana Dregert & Peter Letmathe, 2019. "Consequences of Unfair Job Promotions in Organizations," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 71(1), pages 3-26, February.
    11. Janina Kleinknecht & Daniel Würtenberger, 2022. "Information effects of managerial turnover on effort and performance: Evidence from the German Bundesliga," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(3), pages 791-812, April.
    12. Klaus Abbink & Matthew Ellman, 2004. "The donor problem," Economics Working Papers 796, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2005.
    13. Fanny E. Schories, 2022. "The Influence of Indirect Democracy and Leadership Choice on Cooperation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(4), pages 1173-1201, September.
    14. Ackfeld, Viola & Güth, Werner, 2023. "Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 1-32.
    15. Michael Visser & Matthew Roelofs, 2011. "Heterogeneous preferences for altruism: gender and personality, social status, giving and taking," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(4), pages 490-506, November.
    16. Jin Zheng & Arthur Schram & Tianle Song, 2023. "Social status and prosocial behavior," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(5), pages 1085-1114, November.

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