IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juipol/v11y2003i1p53-57.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Airport slot auctions: desirable or feasible?

Author

Listed:
  • Sentance, A.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Sentance, A., 2003. "Airport slot auctions: desirable or feasible?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 53-57, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:11:y:2003:i:1:p:53-57
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957-1787(02)00058-9
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. S.J. Rassenti & V.L. Smith & R.L. Bulfin, 1982. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 402-417, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lay Eng Teoh & Hooi Ling Khoo, 2016. "Fleet Planning Decision-Making: Two-Stage Optimization with Slot Purchase," Journal of Optimization, Hindawi, vol. 2016, pages 1-12, June.
    2. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    3. Pellegrini, Paola & Rodriguez, Joaquin, 2013. "Single European Sky and Single European Railway Area: A system level analysis of air and rail transportation," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 64-86.
    4. Lorenzo Castelli & Paola Pellegrini & Raffaele Pesenti, 2012. "Airport slot allocation in Europe: economic efficiency and fairness," International Journal of Revenue Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(1/2), pages 28-44.
    5. Paola Pellegrini & Lorenzo Castelli & Raffaele Pesenti, 2011. "Metaheuristic algorithms for the simultaneous slot allocation problem," Working Papers 9, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    6. Stojadinović, Nikola & Bošković, Branislav & Trifunović, Dejan & Janković, Slađana, 2019. "Train path congestion management: Using hybrid auctions for decentralized railway capacity allocation," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 123-139.
    7. Adler, Nicole & Gellman, Aaron, 2012. "Strategies for managing risk in a changing aviation environment," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 24-35.
    8. Ryan Lee & Moayad Shammut & Julian Allen & Xing Gao & Tianren Yang & Mengqiu Cao, 2021. "Investigating the Implications of the London Heathrow Airport Expansion for the Landside Freight Industry," Logistics, MDPI, vol. 5(3), pages 1-18, July.
    9. Sheng, Dian & Li, Zhi-Chun & Xiao, Yi-bin & Fu, Xiaowen, 2015. "Slot auction in an airport network with demand uncertainty," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 79-100.
    10. Eduardo Cardadeiro & João E. Gata, 2023. "Market-based allocation of airport slots: the PAUSE auction mechanism and extensions," Working Papers REM 2023/0260, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
    11. Fu, Xiaowen & Oum, Tae Hoon & Chen, Ruowei & Lei, Zheng, 2015. "Dominant carrier performance and international liberalization – The case of Northeast Asia," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 61-75.
    12. Pertuiset, Thomas & Santos, Georgina, 2014. "Primary auction of slots at European airports," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 66-71.
    13. Pellegrini, Paola & Castelli, Lorenzo & Pesenti, Raffaele, 2012. "Secondary trading of airport slots as a combinatorial exchange," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1009-1022.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Iftekhar, M. S. & Tisdell, J. G., 2018. "Learning in repeated multiple unit combinatorial auctions: An experimental study," Working Papers 267301, University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    2. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    3. Cavusoglu, Sabriye Sera & Macário, Rosário, 2021. "Minimum delay or maximum efficiency? Rising productivity of available capacity at airports: Review of current practice and future needs," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    4. Alessandro Avenali & Tiziana D'Alfonso & Claudio Leporelli & Giorgio Matteucci & Alberto Nastasi & Pierfrancesco Reverberi, 2014. "A supervised market mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation," DIAG Technical Reports 2014-03, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
    5. Mishra, Debasis & Parkes, David C., 2007. "Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 335-366, January.
    6. Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2003. "Auctioning airport slots (?)," Post-Print hal-01021718, HAL.
    7. Jamie Fairbrother & Konstantinos G. Zografos & Kevin D. Glazebrook, 2020. "A Slot-Scheduling Mechanism at Congested Airports that Incorporates Efficiency, Fairness, and Airline Preferences," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(1), pages 115-138, January.
    8. Paul J. Brewer & Charles R. Plott, 2002. "A Decentralized, Smart Market Solution to a Class of Back-Haul Transportation Problems: Concept and Experimental Test Beds," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 32(5), pages 13-36, October.
    9. Soumyakanti Chakraborty & Anup K. Sen & Amitava Bagchi, 2015. "Addressing the valuation problem in multi-round combinatorial auctions," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 1145-1160, October.
    10. Robert W. Day & Peter Cramton, 2012. "Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(3), pages 588-603, June.
    11. Kevin Leyton-Brown & Paul Milgrom & Neil Newman & Ilya Segal, 2023. "Artificial Intelligence and Market Design: Lessons Learned from Radio Spectrum Reallocation," NBER Chapters, in: New Directions in Market Design, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Anthony M. Kwasnica & John O. Ledyard & Dave Porter & Christine DeMartini, 2005. "A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 419-434, March.
    13. Kursad Derinkuyu & Fehmi Tanrisever & Nermin Kurt & Gokhan Ceyhan, 2020. "Optimizing Day-Ahead Electricity Market Prices: Increasing the Total Surplus for Energy Exchange Istanbul," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 22(4), pages 700-716, July.
    14. Brewer, Paul J. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "A binary conflict ascending price (BICAP) mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 857-886, October.
    15. Bourbeau, Benoit & Gabriel Crainic, Teodor & Gendreau, Michel & Robert, Jacques, 2005. "Design for optimized multi-lateral multi-commodity markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 163(2), pages 503-529, June.
    16. M. S. Iftekhar & A. Hailu & R. K. Lindner, 2014. "Does It Pay to Increase Competition in Combinatorial Conservation Auctions?," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 62(3), pages 411-433, September.
    17. Daniele Condorelli, 2007. "Efficient and Equitable Airport Slot Allocation," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 97(1), pages 81-104, January-F.
    18. Eric Budish & Judd B. Kessler, 2022. "Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1107-1130, February.
    19. Sven de Vries & Rakesh Vohra, 2000. "Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey," Discussion Papers 1296, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    20. Ledyard, John & Hanson, Robin & Ishikida, Takashi, 2009. "An experimental test of combinatorial information markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 182-189, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:11:y:2003:i:1:p:53-57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/utilities-policy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.